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Most Americans believe that the United States is a land of liberty.
They probably assume we have been protected by the Bill of Rights since
its ratification in 1791. But, we have not always been. From 1833 until at
least the I93Os,' liberties in the Bill of Rights were largely a matter of
state option.
* Judge Donald Smith Professor of Constitutional and Public Law, Wake Forest University
School of Law. B.A., University of the South; M.A., University of Chicago; J.D., University of North
Carolina School of Law. Thanks to my research assistants Lyndsey Marchman, Travis Talbot, and
Vanessa Zboreak.
I. Many cases have rejected application of the Bill of Rights against the states. See, e.g., Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 320 (1937) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee against state
action all that would be a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments I to VIII) if done by the
Federal Government."); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 92-93 (19o8) ("[B]y a long line of
decisions the first ten Amendments are not operative on the States."); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 552 (1876) (refusing to apply the First and Second Amendments against the state
government). But other early cases did apply the Bill of Rights against the states. See, e.g., Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,707 (193r) ("It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the
press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by state action."); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (I93)
("[T]he opportunity for free political discussion.., is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system. A statute which ... is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of
this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment."); cf.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (holding in the particular facts of this capital case that "the
necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective
appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 368-69 ("[T]he State may thus provide for the punishment of
those who indulge in utterances which incite to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of
organized government by unlawful means.").
I have written extensively on the topic of application of liberties in the Bill of Rights to the
states. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES
FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000) [hereinafter CURTIS, FREE SPEECH]; MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986)
[hereinafter CURTIS, No STATE]; Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State
Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (i98o); Michael Kent Curtis,
Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982) [hereinafter Curtis, Further Adventures]; Michael Kent Curtis,
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In Barron v. Baltimore, the Court rejected a landowner's claim for
compensation under the Takings Clause His wharf had become
inaccessible after the City of Baltimore dumped dirt and gravel from a
road repair project around it.' Chief Justice John Marshall rejected
application of the Bill of Rights to the states as unthinkable: "Had the
people of the several states ... required additional safeguards to liberty
from the apprehended encroachments of their [state] governments," he
wrote, "the remedy was in their own hands ... ," They could have
amended their state constitutions: "The unwieldy and cumbrous
machinery of procuring a recommendation from two-thirds of congress,
and the assent of three-fourths of their sister states, could never have
occurred to any human being as a mode of doing that which might be
effected by the state itself."'
The Chief Justice was mistaken. The unthinkable idea had occurred
to James Madison, the father of the Bill of Rights. Madison's proposal
for a Bill of Rights had included specific limits on the states in the
interest of protecting liberty.6 Madison had provided that "no State shall
violate the equal right of conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury
in criminal cases."7 He made this proposal "because it is proper that
every Government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon
those particular rights."8  Madison recognized that some state
constitutions guaranteed these rights, but he thought it wise to obtain
"double security on those points" because "State Governments are as
liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the General Government is,
and therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against."9 The House of
Representatives agreed with Madison, though it thought he did not go
Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the
United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, Historical Linguistics]; Michael Kent
Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases
Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. I
(1996); Michael Kent Curtis, Still Further Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Rebuttal to Raoul
Berger's Reply on Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 62 N.C. L. REv. 517 (1984) (Mr.
Berger's rejoinders are cited in each of the foregoing pieces). This piece is the second recent overview
I have written. For the first, more extensive one, see Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the
States: An Overview From One Perspective, 18 J. CoNTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming Sept. 2009)
[hereinafter Curtis, Bill of Rights], available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1334687.
2. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833).
3. Id. at 243-44.
4. Id. at 249.
5. Id. at 250.
6. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438-42 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
7. Id. at 44o-4i.
8. Id. at 441.
9. Id.
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far enough. It added free speech to the list.' The plan was rejected in the
Senate."
Before the Civil War, the Court continued to reject claims that
liberties in the Bill of Rights limited the states." A number of
distinguished people saw the matter differently.'3 They believed that,
properly understood, the Constitution did require the states to respect its
guarantees of liberty, though they differed on whether the guarantees
were legally enforceable under a proper understanding of the law.'
4
The Fourteenth Amendment, passed by Congress in i866 and
ratified by the states by i868, should have changed things. The
Amendment provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside."'5 It then listed new
protections for citizens and persons:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.'6
The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to give the nation a new
birth of freedom. It limited the semi-sovereign state in the interest of
greater national protection for liberty and equality. The pre-Civil War
semi-sovereign state had been free to deny, selectively or generally, basic
Bill of Rights liberties.'" It had been free to discriminate based on color
10. 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY IO89 (Leon Friedman
et al. eds., 1971).
It. Id. at I145-46.
12. E.g., Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 6o9 (1845) ("The Constitution makes no
provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the
state constitutions and laws .. "); Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 517-18 (1833) (refusing
to apply the constitutional right to a jury trial to civil cases).
13. Georgia Supreme Court Chief Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin is one example. See Campbell
v. State, I 1 Ga. 353, 365-73 (1852) (discussing the uselessness of "shield[ing] [the people] from a blow
aimed by the Federal arm, if they are liable to be prostrated by one dealt with equal fatality by their
own" and citing previously-decided cases in various jurisdictions applying the Bill of Rights against the
states); Nunn v. State, i Ga. 243, 249-51 (1846) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting
the right to bear arms and discussing other cases where the Bill of Rights was applied against the
state). A number of leading Republicans at the time felt this way as well. CuRTIS, No STATE, supra note
s, at 49-56.
14. See supra note 13; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 145-56 (1998) (discussing Barron contrarians); CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note i, at
284-88 (recounting the views of Republicans in Congress in 186o); CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at
6o-6i (discussing views of John A. Bingham in 1859); id. at 49-56 (surveying the views of various
Republican congressmen around the time of the Civil War).
15. U.S. COHsT. amend. XIV, § i.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Permioli, 44 U.S. at 589; Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51
(1833) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not apply against the states); cf Scott v. Sandford
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and many states (including some in the North), had done so, denying
blacks both fundamental rights and basic common law rights.'"
I. UNDERSTANDING SECTION I OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment and its Privileges or
Immunities Clause can best be understood from multiple perspectives:
textual analysis; contextual or intertextual analysis; historical context-
including the grievances that gave rise to the amendment, original
meaning of the words, and the purposes of its leading framers; ethical
aspirations; sound public policy; and arguments from constitutional
structure. 9 While conceptually distinct, these methods sometimes
overlap. I do not embrace the idea that one factor alone should establish
constitutional meaning. The better legal rule results from considering
them all. This discussion focuses heavily on history, which is one, but
only one, factor to consider.
II. DUELING THEORIES
This Article provides some context relevant to application of the
Second Amendment to the states. Section i of the Fourteenth
Amendment in general, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
particular, have been read in two major ways. First, one can read Section
(Dred Scott), 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (holding that Americans descended from slaves were
not citizens).
I8. Cf. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (holding that slaves and their decedents were not citizens of the
United States). For a survey of Northern laws, see Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth
Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415,421-25 (1986).
19. My discussion of multiple means of analysis is indebted to the work of Phillip Bobbitt, Charles
Black, Akhil Amar, William W. Crosskey, and Michael Conant, to whom I am indebted for the term
and concept of "historical linguistics." For scholars who have greatly enriched the case for application,
the reader is urged to consult the very important works of Richard Aynes, and Bryan Wildenthal. See,
e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, I x U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1295 (forthcoming July 2009) (manuscript on file with the Hastings Law Journal); Richard
L. Aynes, On Misreading John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (993)
[hereinafter, Aynes, Misreading]; Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the
Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. I509 (2007)
[hereinafter, Wildenthal, Revisiting]; Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship
and Commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867-73, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
(forthcoming Sept. zoo9), available at http:l/papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=s 3544o4#.
20. Several scholars have explored other factors as well. See AMAR, supra note 14, at t63-214;
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1o YALE L.J. 1193, 1198-284
(1992) (discussing the historical context, text, and incorporation cases); Michael Conant,
Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-
Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 819 (1982) (discussing historical linguistics); William Winslow Crosskey,
Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954) (advocating for the inclusion of prior case law in a historical-context analysis of
the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982). I am indebted to my colleague Wilson Parker who first alerted me to the various methods of
interpretation.
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i (and particularly the Privileges or Immunities Clause) as protecting
both equality and basic liberties for Americans throughout the nation
against state denial or abridgement. Second, one can read Section i of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as simply, and only, prohibiting
racial and similar caste discrimination in rights provided by-and
revocable under-state law.2' By the first reading, all persons would have
rights, for example, to free speech and to bear arms (assuming, as I do,
that the right was considered an individual constitutional right of all
citizens by 1868) and these rights or privileges would be protected at
least against state denial. By the second reading, a state could not take
free speech or the right to keep and bear arms away from African
Americans if it granted the right to whites. But it could abridge the right
for both.
The two readings use different historical contexts. The second
reading focuses on discrimination against African Americans in I866 and
assumes that discrimination was what shaped the Amendment. By the
second reading, the right of African Americans to keep and bear arms
would be protected so long as the right was allowed to whites. But if it
were denied to all, it would not be protected for blacks. When all are
deprived of the right, no one suffers racial discrimination. The same is
true for free speech.
The first reading looks at a longer and larger historical context and
assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment was shaped both by
discrimination against African Americans and by a long history of
abridging constitutional rights for whites as well as blacks. It assumes
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected basic national,
constitutional rights that states could not deny, even if the state deprived
everyone of the right. The Due Process Clause did a similar thing for
many rights of persons. This national-rights reading finds protection for
equality under the Equal Protection Clause. The national-constitutional-
rights approach reads the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect
constitutional rights. As a result, these would include the equality rights
in Article IV, whatever they were understood to be.
This Article will say a lot about free speech. In a piece on the right
to bear arms, this may strike the reader as very odd. Complaints about
denials of free speech are instructive, however. Republican complaints
about denials of free speech-as an example of state denial of
constitutional rights-cannot be explained as aimed at racial
discrimination alone or at discrimination against those from out of state
21. For somewhat different equality-only approaches, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 155-89 (1997); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); John
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, ro YALE L.J. 1385, 1410-33 (1992).
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alone. One might attempt such an explanation as to the denial of the
right of blacks to possess arms in the South after the Civil War, seeing
the problem as only racial discrimination in rights the state could grant or
withhold by state law.
But reading Section I as limited to racial discrimination against
those from out of state does not explain references to free speech and
similar constitutional rights. These, like free speech, would be absolute in
the sense that states could not deny them, even if they did so for all.
Before the Civil War, whites, blacks, out-of-state visitors, in-state
residents got the same free speech rights to criticize slavery-because
denials of the right to free speech on slavery applied equally to both
whites and blacks and to the in-state resident and the out-of-state
visitor.22 Complaints about denials of free speech in the South, coupled
with general complaints about denials of constitutional rights, such as the
right to bear arms, show that absolute, not relative, rights were at issue.23
In the company of references to "all rights of citizens" or "rights of
citizens enumerated in the Constitution," free speech is a metonymy.
That part of the Bill of Rights (and indeed a part of all constitutional
rights) stands for the whole.
Il. MULTIPLE METHODS OF ANALYSIS
A. TEXT
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment supports application of
liberties in the Bill of Rights to the states. First, it creates national and
state citizenship for all persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to its jurisdiction.24 "No state shall" is obviously designed to
limit the states in some new way. They are not to "abridge" (deny,
reduce, or lessen) the "privileges" (federal rights) "of" (shared by all)
"citizens of the United States." One obvious place to look for these
rights is in the rights listed in the Constitution. From reading the text of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it appears that states had been depriving
American citizens of their privileges or immunities, depriving them of
equal protection, and denying them life, liberty, or property without due
process. This was to stop.
Webster's Dictionary defines "privilege" as "A right or immunity, or
benefit enjoyed by a particular person or a restricted group of persons,"
and as "Any of the rights common to all citizens under modern
22. See, e.g., CuRTis, FREE SPEECH, supra note 1, at 261-62 (discussing Virginia statutes, including
one aimed at including all in-state whites); id. at 262-63 (discussing prosecution of a white minister in
North Carolina for giving an antislavery book to a white teenage girl); id. at 289-99 (discussing North
Carolina prosecution of another white minister).
23. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 29-32 (discussing free speech).
24. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § i.
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constitutional government."25 The rights in the Bill of Rights are shared
by all United States citizens. 6
There is a difference between the right (or "privilege" or
"immunity") and the security the law provides for it. For example, the
First Amendment contains rights or freedoms: "the freedom of speech,
or of the press." 7 It also contains limited security for those rights:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging" them. The rights are
recognized and Congress is forbidden from abridging them. So, by
interpretation, are the other branches of the federal government. After
Barron v. Baltimore, all rights in the Bill of Rights were protected only
by a limited security device. They were secured only against federal
power. 9
As James Madison said in his speech presenting a bill of rights to the
Congress, the English had rights to trial by jury, freedom of the press,
and rights of conscience.3" But the rights were not secured.
I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the
press, or liberty of conscience, come in question in [Parliament], the
invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta
does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights,
respecting which the people of America are most alarmed. The freedom
of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the
people, are unguarded in the British Constitution.
As this makes clear, Madison distinguished the right from the
security device to protect it. The British had the right, but no adequate
security device for it. Some American states lacked security for at least
some of the rights." Some states did have a security device-
constitutional protection-but Madison thought "double security" would
be a good idea.3  The ship of state should have lifeboats as well as a
double hull.34 The Fourteenth Amendment assumed that Americans had
constitutional rights they all shared-and that needed to be secured
against state abridgment.
But were the words "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" an apt way to describe the liberties and immunities in the
25. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1074 (1991).
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amends. I-VIII. Note also the references to the "right of the people" in
the right to assemble and petition, and in the Fourth Amendment. All the amendments are rights
shared by the people of the United States, as is apparent from their wording.
27. Id. amend. I.
28. Id.
29. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833).
30. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436-42 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1789).
31. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 466-67 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
33. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 441 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1789).
34. The metaphor is from Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 23-24 (1988).
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Bill of Rights? Yes. By i868, there was a long history of describing
liberties such as those in the Bill of Rights as privileges or immunities.35
There was also a long history of describing them, as Madison did, as
rights of the people of the United States., 6 They were often also referred
to as rights under the Federal Constitution or as rights of American
citizens.37 There are several examples of this usage continuing up to,
through, and well beyond the Civil War. 8 These examples show that the
word "privilege" was equivalent to the word "right," and that "privilege"
was commonly used to describe constitutional rights.39 After the
ratification of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution's rights were described
as privileges and as rights of American citizens.' Here I will give some
examples; for others I encourage interested readers to consult the
sources cited in the notes.'
The use of the words "privilege" and "immunity" as encompassing
basic rights predates the Constitution. In the Writs of Assistance Case,
James Otis argued against general warrants as an invasion of the
"freedom of one's house."4 He said that "[t]his writ, if it should be
declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege."43 Cato's Letters
were essays on liberty and were pervasively reprinted in the colonies.'
Cato describes "Freedom of Speech" as the "Right of every Man," and
according to Cato, "[tjhis sacred Priviledge" was "essential to free
Governments."'45
When the judges in the William Penn trial threatened the jury for
bringing in a verdict of not guilty, Penn saw the action as an attack on the
right to jury trial. 6 He urged his jurors to "mind your privilege, give not
away your right."'47 Before the Revolution, Benjamin Franklin, writing as
"Silence Dogood," explained that "I am naturally very jealous for the
Rights and Liberties of my Country; & the least appearance of an
35. See generally Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note I, at 1071-151 (describing the historic
use of the words privileges or immunities).
36. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 43 1-69 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
37. Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note I, passim.
38. Id. at 1071-152.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. AMAR, supra note i4; Conant, supra note 20; Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note i, at
1071-152.
42. John Adams, Abstract of the Argument, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 134, 142 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Zenger's Journal Presents "Cato," in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 10, 11
(Leonard W. Levy ed., 1996) (emphasis added).
46. The People's Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted, in the Trial of William Penn and William
Mead, in I SELECt WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 79-96 (3d ed. 1782).
47. Id. at 98.
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Incroachment on those invaluable Priviledges, is apt to make my Blood
boil exceedingly. '48 William Blackstone describes the right to trial by jury
as "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy. 49
Indeed, Blackstone describes all the rights set out in the great documents
of English liberty as "privileges" or "immunities."5 The usage is common
in American revolutionary declarations, describing all the basic rights of
the English as "all the privileges, immunities, and advantages of the
people of Great Britain" and describing trial by jury by peers of the
vicinage, according to due course of law, as "the great and inestimable
privilege."5'
In the debate on the Sedition Act,5" Congressman Edward
Livingston said that the Constitution provided that "no law shall be
passed to abridge the liberty of speech and of the press.... This privilege
is connected with another dear and valuable privilege-the liberty of
conscience. "
In the 183os, Elijah Lovejoy was a minister and antislavery
newspaper editor in Missouri, whose printing presses had been
repeatedly seized and destroyed by mobs.54 Lovejoy took refuge in
Alton, Illinois, but mobs pursued him there and again destroyed his
press.5 Lovejoy was ultimately killed defending his fourth press from a
mob. 6 His death produced massive protests, and, together with other
mob attacks on abolitionists, it refrained the slavery issue.57
Newspaper editorials and public meetings condemned the killing as
an attack on free speech and press, and on the rights of citizens of the
United States. "Freedom of opinion and of the press," the Baltimore
Lutheran Observer insisted, "is an inalienable privilege secured to us by
our political magna charta .... ,5 Citizens of the country would not
48. Silence Dogood, Letter to the Editor, Silence Dogood No. 2, NEw-ENGLAND COURANT, Apr.
16, 1722, reprinted in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, WRITINGS 8 (J.A. Leo Lemay ed., 1987) (emphasis added).
49. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379 (emphasis added).
50. See id. at *9O-iOO.
51. A.E. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA 175, 180 (1968) (emphasis added).
52. Ch. 74, I stat. 596 (1798).
53. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2153 (1798) (emphasis added).
54. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 216-17.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 216-29. For early and important work on speech suppression, see generally CLEMENT
EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SoUTH (Harper & Row 1964) (1940);
RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 183-1860
(1949); and W. SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DIsTRmrBULON OF ABOLmON LITERATURE
1830-1860 (1938).
58. Testimonies of the Spirit of Liberty, 2 EMANCIPATOR 129 (1837) (quoting the Baltimore
Lutheran Observer).
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"consent to surrender this inestimable privilege."59 A resolution from a
New York meeting of young men described "liberty of the press, [and] of
speech" as "prerogatives of a free people," and insisted that "their
exercise is guaranteed to every citizen by the Federal Constitution."" A
New Hampshire paper described Lovejoy as battling to protect freedom
of speech and press and "all the sacred rights secured to the citizens by
the Constitution of these U.S."6' The Newark Daily Advertiser described
"the right of free discussion" as an "inalienable privilege of a freeman."
62
In his 1841 inaugural address, President William Henry Harrison
said that the American Constitution both granted and withheld power.63
In contrast to the sovereignty of ancient Greece or Rome, American
sovereignty could "interfere with no one's faith, prescribe forms of
worship for no one's observance, inflict no punishment but after well-
ascertained guilt, the result of investigation under rules prescribed by the
Constitution itself," a reference to many of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.64 "These precious privileges," and those of "giving expression to
his thoughts and opinions," were not only rights conferred by
constitutions, they were basic human rights.
65
As President Harrison did, it was common to describe rights in the
Federal Bill of Rights, and comparable rights in state bills of rights, as
privileges or immunities. Both courts and lawyers used the words in this
way. State courts referred, for example, to the privilege and immunity of
grand jury indictment, 66 the protection against double jeopardy (the
privilege), 67 the privilege of the accused to have counsel, 68 the right to
worship according to conscience and against giving preference to any
religion ("these religious privileges, secured by these sections of the
constitution of the republic and state"), 69 and "the freedom of religious
profession and worship" (a "constitutional privilege"). 70
In federal court, Chief Justice Marshall referred to the "valuable
privilege" of the accused of being confronted by his accuser;7' Justice
59. Id. (quoting the Baltimore Lutheran Observer).
60. Meeting of Young Men in New York, 2 EMANCIPATOR 154 (1838).
61. Testimonials of a Free Press, EMANCIPATOR EXTRA, Feb. 12, 1838, at 2 (quoting the New
Hampshire Courier).
62. The Voice of the Public Press, 2 EMANCIPATOR 120 (1837) (quoting the New York Daily News).
63. Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note I, at 1115.
64. William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address of William Henry Harrison (Mar. 4, 1841), in
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO
HARRY S. TRUMAN 1946, at 63-64 (1952).
65. Id. (emphasis omitted).
66. See, e.g., Joues v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329,344 (1857).
67. See, e.g., Sutcliffe v. State, I8 Ohio 469, 477-79 (1849).
68. See, e.g., People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581,584 (1859); Dean v. State, 43 Ga. 218, 220 (1871).
69. See Gabel v. City of Houston, 29 Tex. 335, 344-45 (I867).
70. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502,54 (1858) (emphasis omitted).
71. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 27,29 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, D. Va. i8o7) (No. 14,692c).
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Bushrod Washington referred to the "privilege of having the assistance
of counsel,"72 and Justice William Johnson used the words "privileges"
and "immunities" as equivalent to constitutional rights listed in a "bill of
rights."73
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, counsel for Pennsylvania argued that
allowing seizure and removal of an alleged slave from the state by her
alleged owner without a due process hearing violated the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures.74 Until the person
was proved a slave, counsel argued, he was presumed free, "and,
therefore, if you seize him, it is a violation of this constitutional
privilege."75 In another widely publicized case, General Ambrose
Burnside arrested former Democratic Congressman Clement
Vallandigham for making an anti-war speech and tried him before a
military commission-all in apparent violation of his right to grand jury
indictment and jury trial as well as of his right to free speech. 6
Vallandigham's lawyer argued that the action was a "sacrifice of our
ancestral rights, by the destruction of our constitutional privileges."'77
Another type of textual analysis is intratextual. It focuses on how
words are used in other parts of the Constitution.78 For example, the
original constitutional limits on the states in the interest of liberty in
Article I, Section io, are prefaced with the words "no state shall."79
Text is one way to understand the meaning of a constitutional
provision. Inevitably there are always various ways to read the words in
the text-though some seem to me better than others. Meaning is
contextual. So for the best understanding of meaning, we should look at
the historical context. In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
broader context is needed-broader than the context one gets just from
looking at selected parts of the historical record in I866.
History on questions of this sort is always somewhat mixed. One can
never prove that all understood a constitutional provision in the same
72. Ex parte Craig, 6 F. Cas. 710,711 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827) (No. 3321).
73. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, i F. Cas. 658, 660 (Johnson, Circuit Justice, C.C.S.C. i8oo) (No. 302a).
74. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,576 (1842).
75. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
76. See generally Ex Parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. s6,816). For a
discussion of the case, see Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the
Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 121-31 (1998).
77. Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 88o; see also Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (i9 How.)
393, passim (1857) (using the words "right" and "privilege" interchangeably); Curtis, Historical
Linguistics, supra note I, at 1131 (quoting Joseph Story, 3 COMMENTARMES ON THE CoNsTrrmON OF THE
UNrED STATEs 654 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833)). For usage during the Civil War, see
CuRns, FRE SPEECH, supra note I, at 316, 332-33; and Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note i, at
1123.
78. Akhil Reed Amar, Intertextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788 (I999).
79. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § lo.
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way, or that the words were capable of only one sort of meaning.
Historical context helps to reduce ambiguity as to the historical meaning.
Additionally, the existence of some contrary evidence is not alone
sufficient to dismiss a historical hypothesis relevant to the legal meaning
of the text.
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE GRIEVANCES THAT GAVE RISE TO THE
AMENDMENT
The original Constitution was defective. It sought to protect two
ultimately incompatible systems-slavery and liberty. As Congressman
William Newell explained in i866, "this Constitution of our fathers"
contained "an element foreign to its genius and principles, flatly
subversive of the ideas on which it was founded, and which gave the lie
direct to its declaration of rights." '
After the Revolution, Northern states abolished slavery, some more
slowly than others.8' Abolition in the North left the nation divided
between free and slave states.82 In the 1830s, abolitionists began to
reframe the slavery question. Abolitionist speakers traveled throughout
the North, preaching the gospel of abolition.8' They published tracts and
newspapers; they held meetings.84
The response to the call for "abolition now" was furious."g Mobs in
the North broke up abolition meetings, destroyed the presses of abolition
newspapers, and demanded that the abolitionists shut up.86 The violence
was rationalized, of course. Critics insisted that raising the slavery
question threatened slave revolts and disunion; slavery was none of the
North's concern. 7 Southern states demanded that the North silence
abolitionists by law, but no nonslave state complied. 88 The issue would
not go away. The effort to shut up the abolitionists reframed the issue. It
was now a question of liberty of speech, press, and opinion for people in
the North. Moreover, the more the nation acquired new territory, the
more acute the slavery question became. The South insisted on new
80. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., Ist Sess. 866 (1866).
8I. RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
1837-186o, at 3-5 (1976).
82. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 52-54 (1963).
83. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 127-28.
84. Id. at 128.
85. Id. at 129-54.
86. See generally CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I; NYE, supra note 57, at 156-61; LEONARD
RICHARD, GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING: ANTI-ABOLITION MOBS IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA
(i97o); Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press,
and Petition in 1835-1837,89 Nw. U. L. REV. 785 (1995).
87. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 133-36.
88. See id. at 182-87.
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territory and new guarantees for slavery."' Many Northerners resisted
Southern demands.9
Increasingly, slavery became the central political issue facing the
nation.9 The repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854 galvanized
opponents of slavery. 92 Northern Democrats who had supported the
repeal were decimated in congressional elections.' The Republican
Party, the latest and strongest in a succession of antislavery parties,
sprang into existence in 1854 and made a strong run for the presidency in
1856.' The central plank of its platform was not abolition but exclusion
of slavery from all national territories.95 This idea had broad appeal in the
North.96 The Southern elite found it intolerable.' The I856 campaign
slogan of the new Republican Party was "Free Speech, Free Press, Free
Men, Free Territory, and Fremont."
98
The call for free speech was pertinent. The Republican Party was
not able to exist or campaign in the South.99 That was one fact on which
Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas agreed in their famous
debates.'" The South was a closed society. There were two mechanisms
for prohibiting the Republican Party in the South-mobs and laws. A
couple of examples from North Carolina show the system at work.
Benjamin Hedrick was a talented chemistry professor at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.'0 ' In 1856, he told some of
his students that he favored the Republican candidate, John C. Fremont,
for President.' The Raleigh Weekly Standard got wind of the story and
89. Id. at 119-20.
9o. Id. at 132.
91. Id. at 131.
92. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCO7T CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS 188 (1978).
93. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 27.
94. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 265.
95. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 184o-1956, at 27, 32 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce Johnson
eds., 1956) (describing Republican platforms of 1856 through i86o calling for a ban on slavery in the
national territories).
96. This is shown by the reaction to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise which had prohibited
slavery north of latitude 360 30', giving rise to the Republican Party. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 92,
at 185-92.
97. E.g., Letter from Jefferson Davis to the Confederate Congress (Apr. 29, 1861), in 5 JEFFERSON
DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONALIST: HIS LETIERS, PAPERS, AND SPEECHES 72 (Dunbar Roland ed., 1923); Michael
Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty, The Lost Cause Meets the "Lost
Clause," 36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 619-20 (2003) (describing reasons for secession).
98. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 281. See generally POTrER, supra note 82, at 247-65
(evolution of the Republican Party).
99. NYE, supra note 57, at 156-61.
Ioo. See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 30-31.
to. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 290.
102. Id.
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outed Hedrick as a Republican." The trustees of the University fired
him from his job, and when he went home to Salisbury, North Carolina,
the threat of mob violence drove him from the state. 4 The Raleigh
newspaper was proud of its accomplishment; it exalted, "[olur object was
to rid the University and the State of an avowed Fr6mont man; and we
succeeded. And we now say.., that no man who is avowedly for John C.
Fr6mont for President ought to be allowed to breathe the air or tread the
soil of North Carolina. ' ' "°5
Slave states also had laws that punished antislavery expression. For
example, a North Carolina statute punished distributors of any pamphlet
or paper that had a "tendency" to make slaves or free blacks
discontented.' 6 In 185o, a Wesleyan minister had been sentenced to the
pillory, whipping, and imprisonment for giving a teenage white girl a
pamphlet that said slavery was inconsistent with the Ten
Commandments.07 He escaped punishment only by agreeing to leave the
state.""
In 1857, Hinton Helper, a North Carolinian, had published a book,
The Impending Crisis of the South."'9 It argued that slavery was
responsible for the economic backwardness of the South and depressed
the condition of free white non-slaveholders (who were a substantial
majority of the white population)."' Helper advocated peaceful political
action in each slave state to abolish slavery.'
Nearly half of the Republicans in the House of Representatives had
endorsed a plan to publish a condensed version of Helper's book as a
Republican campaign tract, including John Sherman, who was the
Republican candidate for Speaker of the House from 1859 to i86o."' The
speakership election coincided with the John Brown raid."3 Southerners
and Democrats treated the Helper book as the textbook of revolution
that inspired John Brown, and treated Republican endorsers as
accessories before the fact to Brown's crime."
103. Id.
104. Id.
1o5. Mr. Hedrick, Once More, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 5, 1856, at I. Hedrick's case was
typical. See Curtis, supra note 97, at 649 (discussing similar mob attacks).
io6. An Act to Prevent Circulation of Seditious Publications and for Other Purposes, ch. 5, 183° -
1831 N.C. Sess. Laws 1o; CURaTs, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 125.
107. CuRTIs, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 262-63.
io8. Id. at 263.
1o9. HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOuTH: HOW TO MEET IT (George M.
Fredrickson ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1857).
IIo. Id. at 40-45.
IIi. Id. at 149.
112. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 1, at 272-75.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 274.
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In 1859, Daniel Worth was another Wesleyan minister, preaching in
Guilford and Randolph counties of North Carolina."5 He was a
Republican Party activist and had been distributing copies of the Helper
book and selling subscriptions to the Republican New York Tribune."6
Like Professor Hedrick before him, Worth was outed by the Raleigh
newspaper, prosecuted for distributing copies of the Helper book,
convicted, and sentenced to prison."7 The trial judge, however, refused to
sentence the elderly minister to whipping, and allowed him to be free on
bail pending appeal."8 Worth left the state."9 His conviction was upheld
by the North Carolina Supreme Court on the theory that if distribution
of Helper's book to whites was allowed, the book's ideas might reach
blacks and slaves.' 0 In 186o, the North Carolina legislature changed its
incendiary documents statute to provide the death penalty for the first
offense.''
Protecting the South from antislavery books required a censorship
regime that included searches. In December 1859, the North Carolina
Council of State passed a resolution saying postmasters who delivered
incendiary books or newspapers should be prosecuted as circulators of
the item." Another resolution instructed public officers to subject out-
of-state merchants, book dealers, tract distributors, and lecturers to "the
strictest scrutiny.
' '1M
John A. Bingham, future author of most of Section i of the
Fourteenth Amendment, was an endorser of the Helper book. 4 So were
three of the seven Republicans on the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction that reported the Amendment to the Congress. 5 So
were the Speaker of the House in 1866 and the Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee. I"6 In the South, before the war, however, these men
were viewed as felons, to be whipped and imprisoned if they came within
the jurisdiction. 7 These attacks on their rights of free speech and
political association did not sit well with Republicans. ,
8
115. Id. at 289-9o.
116. Id.
117. Id.
It8. Id. at 294-95.
I 19. Id. at 295.
120. State v. Worth, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 488 (i86o).
21. Act of Feb. 23, 1861, ch. 23, I86o-I86i N.C. Sess. Laws 39; CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I,
at 295-96.
122. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 1, at 290 (citing The Council of State, RALEIGH WKLY.
STANDARD, Dec. 14, 1859, at I).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 36o.
125. Id.
126. Id. For an early defense of a national right to free speech, see id. at 267.
127. Id. at 360.
128. Id. at 298-99.
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In 1859, the House of Representatives considered the admission of
Oregon to the Union.29 The proposed state constitution prohibited free
blacks, not already in the state, from entering it, from owning property in
the state, from making contracts, and from bringing court actions. 3'
Bingham insisted that (contrary to Dred Scott), free African Americans
were citizens of the United States. 3 ' He denied that "any State may
exclude a law abiding citizen of the United States from coming within its
Territory, or abiding therein, or acquiring and enjoying property
therein.' 3. Bingham said:
The citizens of each State, all the citizens of each State, being citizens
of the United States, shall be entitled to "all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several States." Not to the rights and immunities of
the several States; not to those constitutional rights and immunities
which result exclusively from State authority or State legislation; but to
"all privileges and immunities" of citizens of the United States in the
several States. There is an ellipsis in the language employed in the
Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is "the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States in the several states" that it
guaranties."'
Among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
that states were required to respect were those in the Bill of Rights.
Bingham said that the persons Oregon excluded were "citizens of the
United States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, amongst which are the rights
of life and liberty and property, and their due protection in the
enjoyment thereof by law."'34 So the exclusion violated Article IV,
Section 2, which, in addition to travel rights, also encompassed the Due
Process Clause and other constitutional liberties. As a matter of
constitutional obligation -albeit one that could not be enforced by
Bingham's view-the Bill of Rights limited the states even before the
Civil War.
Such ideas were anathema to the Southern slaveholding elite. These
ideas meant that free blacks had a right to come into the state, to speak,
preach, assemble, and bear arms. These rights were substantially limited
or flatly prohibited for a state's own slaves and often for its free blacks.'35
129. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 968 (1859).
130. Id. at 974.
131. Id. at 983; CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 60.
132. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 984.
135. See, e.g., REVISED CODE OF NORTh CAROLINA 575 (Bartholomew F. Moore & Asa Biggs eds.,
1855) (unlawful for free blacks to migrate into the state of North Carolina); id. at 574 (emancipated
slaves generally required to leave the state within ninety days and not to return); id. at 578 (blacks,
Indians, and persons of mixed blood, as defined, cannot be witnesses in court except against each-a
blatant denial of due process); id. at 577 (free blacks may not have a shotgun, rifle, pistol, sword, etc.,
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Even worse, these ideas meant that regulations imposed on the state's
own free black population (against bearing arms, for example) would
also violate Bill of Rights liberties.
Debates in Congress that preceded the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment show two things: deep Republican dissatisfaction with the
protection that the liberties in the Bill of Rights were getting from the
slave states (and others such as Oregon), and the view that these liberties
were rights of American citizens that states should protect, not
suppress. '
In the acrimonious debates in i86o over Helper's Impending Crisis,
Republicans complained about the abuse of constitutional rights in the
South. Republican Sidney Edgerton of Ohio said that "[f]or years, in
most of the slaveholding States, the most sacred provisions of the
Constitution have been wantonly and persistently violated. Where is the
liberty of speech and of the press in the slaveholding states?"'37 Preachers
could not "discuss the moral bearings of slavery.".. He had studied the
Helper book. Those who charged that it advised "insurrection, treason,
servile war, arson, and murder" had "never... read the book."'39 Still, to
sell this "harmless book in a slave state is considered a crime. Where is
your constitutional liberty?"'4 The "liberty of South Carolina" was
equivalent to "the despotism of Austria.".'4' Edgerton said the North
demanded "the observance of constitutional obligations" and the
protection of Northern citizens "in the enjoyment of their constitutional
rights. She demands the freedom of speech and of the press; and if your
peculiar institution cannot stand before them, let it go down. ' '42
According to Representative Henry Waldron of Michigan, the
"slave Democracy" trampled the Constitution under foot.'43 "Today a
without a special license); id. at 576 (free persons of color generally may not preach or exhort to slaves
of other families, or teach another slave or free blacks how to read); id. at 221 (free blacks going on
board ships between sunset and sunrise to be punished by forty lashes); see also ALLISON GOODYEAR
FREEHLING, DRIF'r TOWARD DISSOLUTION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVERY DEBATE OF 1831-1832, at 188-93
(1982); CHARLES SYDNOR, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM 1819-1848, in 5 A HISTORY OF
THE SoUTm 223, 226 (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coulter eds., 1948); ANDREW E.
TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1789-1868, at
12-13, 109-1o, 112 (2oo6) (general searches of slaves and slave cabins and restrictions on unlawful
assembly for slaves and free blacks).
136. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 229 n.57; see also, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., 2d Sess.
193 (1865) (Rep. Kasson); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., sIt Sess. 114-15 (1864) (Rep. Arnold); id. at 1202
(1864) (Rep. Wilson); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., ist Sess. 930-31 (186o) (Rep. Edgerton).
137. CONG. GLOBE. 36th Cong., Ist Sess. 930 (s86o); CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note I, at 284.
138. Supra note 137.
139. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., ist Sess. 930 (186o).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 93o-31.
142. Id. at 931.
143. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Ist Sess. 1872 (186o).
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system of espionage prevails which would disgrace the despotism and
darkness of the middle ages.... Where slavery is there can be no free
speech, no free thought, no free press, no regard for constitutions .... ""
In the 186o debate, Congressman Owen Lovejoy, brother of the
slain antislavery editor, defended Helper's book and insisted on his
constitutional right to recommend its circulation anywhere in the
nation. 14 "I do claim the right of discussing this question of slavery
anywhere, on any square foot of American soil over which the stars and
stripes float, and to which the privileges and immunities of the
Constitution extend.... [Tihat Constitution ... guaranties to me free
speech... Lovejoy claimed "the privilege of going anywhere.., as a
free citizen, unmolested, and of uttering in an orderly and legal way, any
sentiment that I choose to utter."'47 He complained that Southern states
"imprison or exile preachers of the Gospel."'
In i86o, when Jefferson Davis offered a resolution in the Senate
opposing overt or covert attacks on slavery, Republican Senator James
Harlan offered an amendment that got the support of every Senate
Republican who voted on the issue.'49
But the free discussion of the morality and expediency of slavery
should never be interfered with by the laws of any State, or of the
United States; and the freedom of speech and of the press, on this and
every other subject of domestic [state] and national policy, should be
maintained inviolate in all the States.'
Concern for slavery and its effect on civil liberty was a recurring
theme in the debates over its abolition during the Civil War. In speaking
in favor of a resolution for a constitutional amendment abolishing
slavery, Representative James Wilson of Iowa (chairman of the Judiciary
Committee in the Thirty-Ninth Congress) said that
[fireedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and press, and the
right of assemblage for the purpose of petition belong to every
American citizen, high or low, rich or poor, wherever he may be within
the jurisdiction of the United States. With these rights no State ma
interfere without breach of the bond which holds the Union together.'
Still, slavery had practically destroyed these rights because it
persecuted religionists, denied the privilege of free discussion,
prevented free elections, [and] trampled upon all of the constitutional
guarantees belonging to the citizen .... [T]he blessings of our free
144. Id.
145. Id. app. at 205.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2321.
150. Id.
151. CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., ist Sess. 1202 (1864).
[Vol. 6o: 14451462
June 2009] THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES AFTER HELLER 1463
institutions were mere fables. An aristocracy enjoyed unlimited power,
while the people were pressed to the earth and denied the inestimable
privileges which by right they should have enjoyed in all the fullness
designed by the Constitution.
52
While Wilson mentioned rights of speech, press, religion, and
petition, his list was simply illustrative of denials of constitutional rights.
He said that "slavery disregards the supremacy of the Constitution and
denies to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States.'
' 53
These excerpts from congressional debates from 1864 through i866
show at least three things: (i) Republican concern with state abridgment
of the liberties of American citizens; (2) a constitutional theory by which,
under "proper" understanding, states were required to obey the basic
liberties (the privileges or immunities of American citizens) set out in the
Constitution; and finally (3) common usage of the words "privileges" or
"immunities" to describe constitutional rights including those in the Bill
of Rights. Were these ideas hidden under the dome of the Capitol? No.
i. The End of the Civil War and the Black Codes
With the end of the Civil War and with the abolition of slavery, the
nation faced difficult issues: the status of the former Confederate states
and the status of the newly freed slaves. With slavery abolished, the
former slaves would count as whole persons, rather than three-fifths of a
person, for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives
and for purposes of votes in the electoral college.'54 The prospect that the
Confederate states, having lost the war, would ride back into political
power on the backs of disfranchised former slaves was intolerable to the
Republicans and most of the North.' Andrew Johnson set up
provisional governments in the former rebel states, and the former
Confederate states sought admission to Congress."6 Congress refused to
seat delegates from the former Confederacy while it decided on terms for
reunion.'
The former rebel states all ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, as
President Andrew Johnson required. 8 But these states and localities
passed Black Codes to regulate the newly freed African Americans.'59
For example, St. Landry Parish, Louisiana, prohibited blacks from
passing within the limits of the parish without special permit in writing
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
155. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note i, at 14.





from their employer; from being out after ten o'clock at night without
special permission; from keeping or renting a house within the parish;
from holding public meetings after sunset or at any time without special
permission in writing from the captain of the patrol; from preaching,
exhorting, or otherwise declaiming to colored people without special
permission from the president of the police jury; from carrying firearms
within the parish without special permission; and from selling, bartering,
or exchanging articles of merchandise without special written permission
from their employer specifying the article to be traded.' 6° These codes
discriminated based on race and (if one assumed, as many Republicans
did, that states should obey the Bill of Rights), they abridged Bill of
Rights liberties such as speech, assembly, religion, and the right to bear
arms.
In i866, Congress considered responses. Generally applicable
guarantees of liberty (guarantees that protected all citizens), in addition
to a guarantee of equal protection, were two reciprocally-reinforcing
ways to grant equality to newly freed slaves and to protect loyal whites in
the South.
2. The Issues in Congress
When Congress assembled in late 1865 and in 1866, congressmen
discussed what sort of reconstruction should be required in the former
rebel states before their full restoration.' 6' In the face of the Black Codes
and reports of abuse by loyal whites from the South, Republican
congressmen concluded that slavery was being revived in a new guise.'62
Once again, basic liberties of Americans were being abridged.
A number of congressmen recalled the suppression of speech and
opinion, both in the slave states and in the Kansas territory, which had
had slavery and a slave code like that of slave states.' 63 Indeed, the i856
Republican Platform complained about denials of civil liberty in the
Kansas Territory:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms has been infringed.
The right of an accused person to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury has been denied;
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, has been
violated;
i6o. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 516-17 (1866) (ordinance of Opelousas, La.).
i6i. CURns, No STATE, supra note i, at 57.
162. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., ist Sess. 785 (1866) (Rep. Ward).
63. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 783, 1013 (i866) (Rep. Plants on Kansas); CURTIS, No
STATE, supra note i, at 32-33 (discussing John Bingham's concerns about laws passed by the Kansas
Territorial Assembly).
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... [T]he freedom of speech and of the press has been abridged[.]'6"
In January, Congressman Bingham recalled that it had been unsafe
to advocate equality on the streets of Charleston because "in defiance of
the Constitution its very guarantees were disregarded." '6, Congressman
Baker insisted on a restoration in which "the American citizen shall no
more be degraded.., by being required to surrender his conscience as a
peace-offering to either an imperious or a suing aristocracy of class."'
6
Senator Timothy Howe said it was generally agreed by "the American
people ... that opinion and speech ought to be free" but that "[w]hoever
raised his voice against [slavery] has been silenced or banished." '67 He
emphasized the need to protect both the freedman and the loyal whites
in the South'u In a later speech Bingham said the Joint Committee was
considering an amendment giving the Congress express power to enforce
rights which were guaranteed from the beginning, but which had been
disregarded.' 6 He warned that congressmen who thought the Congress
already had the power to enforce "all the guarantees of the Constitution"
were mistaken.'70 A corrective amendment was needed.
Bingham looked forward to an amendment by which Congress
would be "empowered to provide by law that hereafter no State shall
make it a crime for a man, whether he be black or white, a citizen of the
Republic, to learn the alphabet of his native tongue and his rights and
duties."''7 ' Several congressmen called for a constitutional amendment
empowering the Congress "to carry out and give effect to every
guarantee of the Constitution.' 72
3. An Early Version of Section i and the Civil Rights Act
Congress responded to the Black Codes by passing the Civil Rights
Act of I866.'73 It made all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, "citizens of
the United States."'' 4 Section i of the Act continued:
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery... shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
164. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 95, at 27.
165. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., Ist Sess. 158 (1866).
166. Id. at 462.
167. Id. at 167.
168. Id. at 168.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 429.
171. Id. at 432.
172. Id. at 741 (Sen. Lane).
173. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
174. Id.
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be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens....,75
The problem was where to find the constitutional power to pass the
Act. Republicans suggested various sources of power, including the new
Thirteenth Amendment.
76
Another theory looked to Article IV, Section 2 and its provision that
the citizens of each state should be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states. The problem was that, by the
majority judicial understanding, these privileges were defined by state
law and the Clause only protected temporary visitors with the same
privileges that citizens of the state they visited enjoyed."' Once a person
became a resident of a state, states could decide what rights different
classes of residents would enjoy. Some, however, relied on a reading of
Article IV by which it protected fundamental rights of citizens, even after
they became state residents.'
Others found the power to pass the bill in the power of Congress to
enforce the Bill of Rights, and particularly the guarantee in the Fifth
Amendment.'79 Both Bingham and James Wilson, chair of the Judiciary
Committee, described the Civil Rights Act as enforcing the Bill of
Rights. Wilson asserted that power; Bingham denied it.'8" A related
theory of congressional power combined the guarantee of republican
government in Article IV with the Bill of Rights, treating the Bill of
Rights as limiting both the states and the federal government and as
setting an appropriate standard for republican government. '
Bingham denied that Congress had the power to pass the Civil
Rights Bill.s2 A constitutional amendment was required. Bingham had
proposed an amendment providing congressional power.
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each States all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property. '83
175. Id.
176. CURTIs, No STATE, supra note i, at 79.
177. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 6o U.S. (i9 How.) 393, 575-76 (1857).
178. CURns, No STATE, supra note i, at 73.
179. CoNo. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. i51 (I866) (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1294 (Rep. Wilson).
18o. CURns, No STATE, supra note i, at 82. For a related theory of congressional power, see CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 1072 (j866), which discusses the views of Senator Nye.
181. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1072 (1866) (discussing the views of Senator Nye).
182. Id. at 1291; id. at 1294 (James Wilson on Rep. Bingham and power to pass the Civil Rights
Bill).
183. Id. at 1034 (Rep. Bingham).
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In the debate over this early version of the Amendment, requiring
states to obey the Bill of Rights (which Bingham suggested was his aim)
was not controversial.' 84 What was controversial was the power to secure
to all persons in the states equal protection in the rights of life, liberty,
and property.' 8s That, critics charged, would allow the Congress to take• 186
over the entire domain of state law. Representative Giles Hotchkiss
noted that problem, as well as a second defect.'8 The Amendment
depended on the action of Congress. What one Congress gave, another
(after an influx of rebels) could take away. Hotchkiss seems to have
focused on the equal protection language:
Now, if the gentleman's object is... to provide against a discrimination
to the injury or exclusion of any class of citizens in any State from the
privileges which other classes enjoy, the right should be incorporated
into the Constitution. It should be a constitutional right that cannot be
wrested from any class of citizens... by mere legislation. But this
amendment proposes to leave it to the caprice of Congress .... 8
The first version of Bingham's amendment was postponed. The first
version had several defects. It did not explicitly limit the states, so it left
the doctrine of Barron v. Baltimore undisturbed. Second, Bingham relied
on his reading of Article IV, Section 2, "the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities [of citizens of the United States]
in the several states. '' 89 By this reading, the Clause protected
fundamental national rights. But most courts read the Clause to protect
only out-of-state temporary visitors from discrimination in some rights
under state law."9
4. The Final Version of the Amendment
The final version of the Amendment was much improved. It made
all persons born or naturalized in the United States citizens of the United
States and of their state. 9 ' It explicitly limited the states and sought to
protect national rights of citizens of the United States, not state-law
rights repealable under state law.'92 The new version provided for
congressional enforcement in Section 5."'
184. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 91.
185. Id. at 81-83.
186. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. lO63 (i866) (Rep. Hale).
187. Id. at 1095.
88. Id.
189. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859); see also CURTIS, No STATE, supra note i, at 60-
61.
19o. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393, 575-76 (1857).
191. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
192. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Stevens).
193. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
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Senator Jacob Howard presented the Amendment to the Senate on
behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.'94 He said the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was "a general prohibition upon all the
States, as such, from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States."'95 He said the Clause protected both privileges and
immunities under Article IV and the rights in the Bill of Rights.' 6 As to
Article IV privileges and immunities, he cited "the case of Corfield vs.
Coryell"'' and quoted from it extensively.' g Howard continued:
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these
privileges and immunities.., should be added the personal rights
guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances ... ; the right to keep and to bear arms; the right
to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a house without the
consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and from any search or seizure except by virtue
of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or affidavit; the right of an
accused person to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
him, and his right to be tried by an impartial jury of the vicinage; and
also the right to be secure against excessive bail and against cruel and
unusual punishments. '
It was
a fact well worthy of attention that the course of decision of our courts
and the present settled doctrine is, that all these immunities, privileges,
rights, thus guarantied by the Constitution or recognized by it, are
secured to the citizen solely as citizens of the United States and as a
party in their courts. They do not operate in the slightest degree as a
restraint or prohibition upon State legislation."°
Here Howard stated the holding of the Barron case. He continued,
"The great object of the first section of this amendment is ... to restrain
the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these
great fundamental guarantees.""
In his speech on the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham explained
that it would "protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all
the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within
194. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., iSt Sess. 2765 (1866); CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 1, at 87.
195. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 2765 (1866).
196. Id.
197. 6 F. Cas. 546 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
198. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 2765 (1866).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2766.
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its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the
unconstitutional acts of any State .....
Representative Thaddeus Stevens quoted Section i and suggested
that "every one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted, in some
form or other, in our Declaration or organic law. But the Constitution
limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the
States."2 3 Stevens continued, apparently focusing on equal protection:
"Whatever law protects the white man shall afford 'equal' protection to
the black man."'2 4 Stevens said it was only partly true that the Civil Rights
Bill secured the same things, but "a law is repealable by a majority."2 5
Senator Richard Yates discussed Section i briefly. Speaking of Section i,
he said it made people born in the nation citizens and "it provides that
their rights shall not be abridged by any State. ' 6 Several other
congressmen also described the Amendment as protecting "all the rights
of citizenship" or "the rights of American citizenship."2" Representative
Jehu Baker quoted the Privileges or Immunities Clause and asked,
"What business is it of any State to do the things here forbidden? To rob
the American citizen of rights thrown around him by the supreme law of
the land? ' '2°8
Except for Bingham and Howard, no one explicitly said that Section
i would require states to obey the guarantees of "the Bill of Rights" and
no one explicitly contradicted them." 9 The lack of references to "the Bill
of Rights" is not particularly surprising. The rights in the Bill of Rights
are some, but not all, of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States." ' When he spoke about the Amendment in 1871,
Bingham said the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
were "chiefly" set out in the first eight Amendments, which he read word
for word."' He also said that after his earlier draft had been postponed,
he reread Barron v. Baltimore and focused on Chief Justice Marshall's
observation that if the framers of the Bill of Rights had intended to limit
the states, they would have followed the example of the Framers of the
original Constitution and used "no state shall" to prohibit the states from
202. Id. at 2542.
203. Id. at 2459.
204. Id.
205. Id.
2o6. Id. at 3038.
207. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 89-9.
2o8. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., Ist Sess. app. at 255-56 (1866). For other comments less explicitly
supportive of application (and, some would say, not supportive), see, for example CURns, No STATE,
supra note 1, at 85-9I.
209. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 216.
210. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; id. § 9, cl. 2-3; id. amend IX.
211. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871).
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violating the rights .... "Acting upon this suggestion," Bingham explained,
"I did imitate the framers of the original Constitution.... 3 So he used the
"no state shall" form used in Article I, Section 10.214
Though no one explicitly contradicted Bingham and Howard, it is
true that some people in Congress said things that some writers have
read as inconsistent with application of the Bill of Rights.215 That is also
true of the political campaign of 1866.216 A comprehensive discussion of
these matters is beyond the scope of this Article. 1 I will, however,
discuss one common description. Some treated Section I as equivalent to
the Civil Rights Act. That was a common description both in Congress
and in the congressional elections of 1866."' Critics have assumed the
Civil Rights Act merely provided equality in rights under state law."9 So
they treat these statements as inconsistent with application of the Bill of
Rights.2 On reflection, however, that view is not convincing.
Recall the wording of the Civil Rights Act. After declaring that
persons born in the country were citizens, the Act provided:
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery.., shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States... to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens . ..
The privileges and immunities in the Bill of Rights are, of course,
provisions for the security of person and property. There was a long




215. See, e.g., Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note I, at I 1 lO-38.
216. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. 2511 (1871) (Rep. Eliot seeming to refer to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as prohibiting discrimination against classes of citizens); Charles
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights? The Original Understanding,
2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 77 (1949).
217. For additional material, see, for example, Fairman, supra note 216, at 43-68 (discussion in
Congress), and at 68-81 (discussion in 1866). Other authorities provide a different interpretation of
these matters. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 14, at 191, 193, 197-99, 200, 202 (critiquing Fairman); id. at
193-97 (critiquing Berger); CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 57-91 (congressional debate); id. at 131-
45 (campaign of 1866); Aynes, Misreading, supra note 19, at 78-83 (discussion in Congress); id. at 67-
69 (campaign of 1866); Crosskey, supra note 2o, at 11-84 (congressional debate); id. at 100-04
(discussion in 1866). See generally Wildenthal, Revisiting, supra note I9 (reviewing the scholarly
debate and evidence). For other critiques of the incorporation doctrine and discussions of evidence,
see, for example, BERGER, supra note 21; James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435, 464-67 (1985); and Donald
Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: Here I Go Down That Wrong
Road Again, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559 (1996).
218. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 1, at 78.
219. See BERGER, supra note 21, at 154-55; NELSON, supra note 21, at 115.
220. See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 86 n.212.
221. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (emphasis added).
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to describe rights such as those in the Bill of Rights.22 In his treatise,
Chancellor Kent describes these rights in that way. '23 The usage appears
in Supreme Court cases, before and after the Fourteenth Amendment.2"
Finally, a virtually identical phrase was used in an early version of the
Freedman's Bureau Act of 1866.225 The bill had provided for "full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
estate, including the constitutional right of bearing arms. ,,, The phrase,
"including the constitutional right of bearing arms" was proposed as an
amendment and the change was accepted.22 Senator Lyman Trumbull
said it did not change the meaning of the section.2
Claims that Section i was equivalent to the Civil Rights Act make
no sense unless the Act was understood to encompass federal
constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights. Section i contained a Due
Process Clause that was clearly more than a guarantee of equal
procedures. It would not do, for example, to decide all cases by a flip of
the coin or by placing a hot iron on the tongue-even if that procedure
were applied equally to all litigants. So suggestions that Section i was
equivalent to the Civil Rights Act imply that the Act contained a federal
standard of due process. Note that the Civil Rights Act required not just
the "equal" but the "full" and equal benefit of laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property. 9 Deciding cases by a flip of the coin
might pass a mere equality test, but it could hardly be described as
providing the full benefit of provisions for the security of person and
property. That is also so for other Bill of Rights liberties. Senator James
Dixon said "Congress has given us, in the Civil Rights Act, a guarantee
for free speech in every part of the Union."23
5. The Campaign of 1866 and Ratification, 1866 to 1868
There are two ways to look at these discussions. One can insist that
the phrase "the Bill of Rights" be included in discussions of Section i. By
this approach, which I reject, there are a limited number of speeches and
222. E.g., 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1-14 (William M. Lacy ed., Phila.,
Blackstone Publ'g Co. 1889) (1827); see also Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism
in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 923, 932 (1986) (discussing Kent
and reliance on him in the Thirty-Ninth Congress).
223. See supra note 222.
224. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (describing Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights as "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property"); Scott v. Sandford (Dred
Scott), 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449-50 (1857).
225. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1292 (1866).
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 654, 743, 1292.
228. Id.
229. Avaim Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
651, 683-84 (979) (pointing out the significance of the word "full").
230. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2332 (1866).
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publications that meet the test. Senator Howard's speech, including its
description of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Bill of Rights,
was reprinted in the New York Herald (the nation's most widely
circulated paper at the time), the Philadelphia Inquirer, the New York
Times, and several other papers."' A later i866 article in the New York
Times discussing the Amendment said it would require the states to obey
the Bill of Rights. 3 ' Bingham published his February i866 congressional
speech on the earlier version of his Amendment in a pamphlet entitled In
Support of the Proposed Amendment to Enforce the Bill of Rights.233
Bingham's speeches on the earlier version and his reference to enforcing
the Bill of Rights were reported in the New York Times.234
A couple of treatises published in 1868 did say the Amendment
would extend the protections of the Bill of Rights to the states. For
example, as Richard Aynes has shown, New York University law
professor John Norton Pomeroy, in his treatise An Introduction to the
Constitutional Law of the United States, "described the first eight
amendments as the 'immunities and privileges guarded by the Bill of
Rights,"' and said Section i would change the rule to require states to
respect the Bill of Rights. 35 Professor Aynes also notes that George W.
Paschal's Constitution of the United States Defined and Carefully
Annotated, published in i868, also supported application. 36 Paschal said
the citizenship clause constitutionalized the Civil Rights Bill and then
added that "[a]ll else in this section has been guarantied in the second
and fourth section of the fourth article; and in the thirteen amendments.
The new feature... is that the general principles, which have been
construed to apply only to the national government, are thus imposed
upon the States." '237
231. See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 89 n.220.
232. Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note I (manuscript at 4 & n.8).
233. JOHN A. BINGHAM, ONE COUNTRY, ONE CONSTITUTION, AND ONE PEOPLE: SPEECH OF HON.
JOHN A. BINGHAM, OF OHIO, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEB. 28, I866, IN SUPPORT OF THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ENFORCE THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1866) (on file at the Library of Congress).
The cover page of the pamphlet appears on the inside back cover of AMAR, supra note 14.
234. Wildenthal, Revisiting, supra note i9, at 1557-58 (summarizing the Times reporting).
235. Aynes, Misreading, supra note 19, at 89 (quoting JOHN N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OP THE UNITED STATES, at i (1868)). Richard Aynes was a trail blazer on this
topic. For recent discussion of treatises at the time, see, for example, Wildenthal, Revisiting, supra note
i9, at 159o-6oo; and George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to
Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627, 1647-49 (2007).
236. Aynes, Misreading, supra note 19, at 85-90.
237. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 290 (1868)). Professor Aynes also cites Judge Timothy Farrar's Manuals of the Constitution to
the same effect and as supporting Bingham's contrarian reading of Barron. See id. at 83-85 (citing
TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1867); TIMOTHY FARRAR,
MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1872)). Thomas Cooley's 1868 treatise on
constitutional limitations and some on criminal procedure did not discuss the Fourteenth
Amendment's first section. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
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Most of the references to Section I that refer to the Bill of Rights in
those words that have been discovered are set out above. The rights of
American citizens included, but were not limited to, those in the Bill of
Rights. There are a number of published statements in 1866 through 1868
that support the idea that personal rights enumerated in the Constitution
will limit the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. These statements
should be read in the context of the broader historical context of the
Amendment set out above. For example, the Republican National
Committee published an address carried by a great many Republican
papers explaining Section I: "All persons born or naturalized in this
country are henceforth citizens of the United States, and shall enjoy all
the rights of citizens ever more; and no State shall have power to
contravene this most righteous and necessary provision."23s A convention
of pro-Republican soldiers and sailors described the Amendment as
defining American citizenship and said it "guarantees all his rights to
every citizen." '39 An editorial in the Dubuque Daily Times said the
Amendment "prohibits any state from making laws to abridge the
privileges rightly conferred on every citizen by the federal constitution,
which instrument, before, only neglected to define who were entitled to
the benefits it conferred.""24 A letter published in the New York Tribune
referred to suppression of abolitionist sentiments in the South. The
writer said,
The rights of American citizens, not only to enjoy their rights, but to
protection in the full enjoyment of them, is now the dogma of the hour.
At last it is to be asserted that it is the paramount duty of the
government to protect its citizens in the full enjoyment of all
constitutional rights, among which are the right to free speech, and to
be secure in their personal property, as well as in redress of their
grievances."'
The Convention of Southern Loyalists convened in Philadelphia in
September i866, after Congress had adjourned and sent the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states. 42 Its proceedings were widely reported in the
Republican press.243 The call for the convention explained the issue
facing the country: "To the loyal unionists of the South: The great issue is
upon us. The majority in Congress, and its supporters, firmly declare that
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Lawbook Exch.,
Ltd. 1998) (1868).
238. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 131 (quoting GALENA WEEKLY GAZETTE (Ill.), Sept. 25,
I866, at 2).
239. Id. (quoting BURLINGTON HAWK EYE (Iowa), Sept. 28, 2866, at I).
240. Id. at 132 (quoting Editorial, DUBUQUE DAILY TIMES, Dec. 3, 1866, at 2).
241. Id. (quoting reprint in DUBUQUE DAILY TIMES, Dec. 3, i866, at 2).
242. Id. at 133.
243. Call for a Convention of Southern Unionists, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, I866, at i; Call for a
Convention of Southern Unionists, TITUSVILLE MORNING HERALD (Pa.), July 14, i866, at i; Call for a
Convention of Southern Unionists, DAILY GAZETTE (Iowa), July 16, i866, at I.
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'the rights of the citizen enumerated in the Constitution, and established
by the supreme law, must be maintained inviolate."'' " On the other
hand, "Rebels and Rebel sympathizers assert that 'the rights of the
citizens must be left to the States alone, and under such regulations as
the respective States choose voluntarily to prescribe."' 5 The call
asserted that "no State, either by its organic law or legislation, can make
transgression on the rights of the citizen legitimate."2 4 It agreed with the
plan of Congress "whereby protection is made coextensive with
citizenship." '247 It also demanded "protection to every citizen of this great
Republic on the basis of equality before the law.""
An appeal issued by the Convention to their fellow citizens recalled
the suppression of civil liberty in the South before the war."9 The report
to the convention of the Committee on Non-Reconstructed States
complained that "[t]he laws passed in the days of slavery for its
protection are enforced with the same exactness today."25 It listed a host
of violations of the liberties in the Bill of Rights: "Citizens have been
arrested on the charge of having told negroes that they were rightfully
entitled to vote, thrown into prison, retained for months, tried by a judge
without a jury, refused time to send for witnesses or counsel, convicted
and sentenced to punishment in the penitentiary. 25' It also demanded
impartial suffrage and equality before the law. 52
Congressman Baker's speech, suggesting that the Amendment
would protect the "rights thrown around [American citizens] by the
supreme law of the land," was reported in the Chicago Tribune.53 A
number of speakers referred to the Amendment's protection of the rights
of citizens and mentioned specifically freedom of speech, arms, and
petition. 54
In later sessions of Congress a number of congressmen and senators
endorsed the idea that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section i
required states to obey guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 5 Some said
244. Proceedings of the Convention, N.Y. TRIB., Sept. 4, I866, at i.




249. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 134-35.
250. WASH. EVENING CHRON., Sept. 9, i866, at I.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Fairman, supra note 216, at 71 n.130 (referring to publication in the Chicago Tribune).
254. E.g., CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 137 (Gov. Hamilton on speech); id. at 137-38 (Gov.
Hawley on arms and the right to petition and also referring to "every right guaranteed ... by the
Constitution"); id. at 138 (Sen. Yates referring to the right of Northerners to speak in the South and
citing Article IV, Section 2 as protecting that right).
255. See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at i6o-68; Curtis, Bill of Rights, supra note I;
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-
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other things."' We have seen Bingham's explicit speech in 1871
describing the Privileges or Immunities Clause as applying the first eight
Amendments to the states. Senator Henry Wilson expressed his
agreement with Bingham.57
C. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The question raised by application of the Bill of Rights to the states
was whether we would be one nation with national minimum standards
of civil liberty. As Chief Justice Lumpkin of the Georgia Supreme Court
noted before the Civil War, the country was in fact one nation, and
protecting its citizens from attacks on their liberties from the federal but
not state governments was an incomplete protection of the American
citizens"5 It was false to assume, Lumpkin said, that "a National press
and State press, were quite separate and distinct." '' Instead it should
constantly be borne in mind, that notwithstanding we may have
different governments.., we have but one people ... and that it is in
vain to shield them from a blow aimed by the Federal arm, if they are
liable to be prostrated by one dealt with equal fatality by their own.'6
IV. THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
In a series of decisions, the Court held, first by implication, and then
expressly, that the Bill of Rights did not limit the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court began
with a "cursory glance" at the post-Civil War Amendments "in
connection with the history of the times.'6 The cursory glance disclosed
a unity of purpose-to protect the newly freed slaves.26 The majority
discussed slavery and the Black Codes and noted that "[it was said" that
the lives of the newly free slaves "were at the mercy of bad men" from
lack of adequate protection.263 Curiously, the majority expressed doubt
that circumstances of the newly free slaves were so dire: "These
circumstances, whatever of falsehood or misconception may have been
1876, at 62-64 (1998); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early
Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 1051, 1116-25 (2ooo).
256. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 114-17 (1871) (Rep. Farnsworth, mostly
discussing state action, but also suggesting the Privileges or Immunities Clause was about
discrimination against blacks); id. at 576 (Sen. Trumbull, equating the Privileges or Immunities Clause
with the Clause of Article IV).
257. Id. app. at 256 (Sen. Wilson: "I concur entirely in the construction put upon that provision of
the fourteenth amendment by Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, by whom it was drawn.").
258. Campbell v. State, is Ga. 353, 366 (1852).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,67 (1873).
262. Id. at 71.
263. Id. at 70.
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mingled with their presentation, forced upon the statesmen" who had
proposed the Thirteenth Amendment "the conviction that something
more was necessary."" 
64
The Court's history was a half truth. It left out the history of
suppression of free speech and civil liberties in the South before the Civil
War, suppression in the interest of slavery. It left out the fact that
Republicans could not even campaign in the South. It left out the fact
that open supporters of the Republican Party had been driven from their
states because of their opinions. It left out the oft-expressed concern in
the Thirty-Ninth Congress for white loyalists and Republicans in the
post-Civil War South.265 It omitted the fact that the Codes also abridged
the rights of African Americans to preach, to assemble and petition, to
speak, and to bear arms.266 And, of course, it omitted the views of
Republicans such as Congressmen John Bingham and James Wilson,
Senator James Nye, and others that Bill of Rights liberties should limit
the states under a proper understanding of the Constitution 6.2 The Court
also said nothing about the speeches of Senator Howard and
Representative Bingham.26
After its radically incomplete history, the Court moved on to the
text of the Amendment. In its textual discussion, the Court distinguished
between the privileges or immunities of United States citizenship and
those privileges and immunities derived from state citizenship! The
majority noted that the pre-Civil War Constitution set only a few limits
on state power in the interest of citizens' civil rights, such as the
prohibition on ex post facto laws. 7° Fair enough. But the Court next held
that privileges and immunities of state citizenship embraced "nearly
every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized
government is instituted., 27' "Was it," the Court asked rhetorically, "the
purpose of the fourteenth amendment.., to transfer the security and
protection of all the civil rights we have mentioned, from the States to
264. Id. (emphasis added).
265. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 12o2 (1864); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Ist Sess. 930-
31 (186o) (Rep. Edgerton); id. at 1872 (Rep. Waldron); id. at 2321 (Sen. Harlan); id. app. at 205 (Rep.
Lovejoy); CURTiS, No STATE, supra note I, at 33, n.57. See generally id. at 57-83.
266. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 516-17 (1866) (ordinance of Opelousas, La.). See
generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 57-83.
267. See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 37-38 (James Wilson in 1864); id. at 49-50 (same);
id. at 8o-8i (James Wilson in the Thirty-Ninth Congress); id. at 53-54 (Sen. James Nye); see also supra
notes 179-8o, 182-84, 189 and accompanying text (discussing the views of Rep. Bingham). See
generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 57-83.
268. See id.; CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., Ist Sess. 2542-43 (1866) (Rep. Bingham); id. at 2765-66
(Sen. Howard).
269. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72.
270. Id. at 77.
271. LId. at 76.
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the Federal government?" '272 If so, Congress would have enforcement
power that would allow it to void all sorts of state laws whenever
Congress "in its discretion" thought the privileges or immunities were
abridged by state legislation."' But that was not all. Congress could pass
laws before states acted to deny rights. This would be a
"'great ... departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions,"
giving Congress power over the "most ordinary and fundamental" state
powers.274 In a puzzling passage, the majority said:
The language is, "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a
protection to the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his
own State, that the word citizen of the State should be left out when it
is so carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the
United States, in the very sentence which precedes it.27'
So, by the Court's reading, "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States" seemed not to be aimed at limiting state legislative power.
After suggesting that virtually all basic liberties existed, if at all, by
state law, the Court proceeded to answer the suggestion that nothing was
left of the Privileges or Immunities Clause: "But lest it should be said
that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those we have
been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some . .. ,,276
Citizens had the right to come to the seat of government, 7  to visit the
nation's sub-treasuries,78 to protection on the high seas and in foreign
lands, 7 to habeas corpus,28° to the right to use the navigable waters of the
United States,'8' and to assemble and petition the national government
(and only the national government, as it turned out),2 82 and the right to
go to and become residents of another state.2"3 Most, if not all, of these
privileges existed, by a structural understanding, under the original
Constitution. Southern states had not passed laws abridging the right of
citizens on the high seas, in foreign lands, to go to Washington, D.C., or
to visit sub-treasuries. It is quite remarkable. According to the majority's
incomplete account, the Amendment was designed to protect the newly
272. Id. at 77.
273. Id. at 78.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 74 (first and third emphases added).







283. Id. at 8o.
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freed slaves. In its very first guarantee, it protected them on their trans-
Atlantic cruises and once they arrived in Paris.
The Slaughter-House Cases presented false alternatives: the utter
destruction of federalism or substantial nullification of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. There was, of course, an unmentioned middle
ground: protecting Bill of Rights liberties and a limited set of less
textually explicit rights -at least from the states.
United States v. Cruikshank, decided in 1875, was the first case
directly to address the Bill of Rights issue.' The Court simply relied on
Barron for the proposition that none of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights limited the states.'8 ' It ignored the history of suppression of civil
liberties in the South in the interest of protecting slavery. It ignored the
historic usage of the words "privileges" and "immunities" to include Bill
of Rights liberties. It ignored the speeches made in Congress by the
leading proponents of the Amendment. It said, just eight years after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, that it was too late in the day
to reconsider the Barron decision.' 6 By the Court's view in Cruikshank,
the inaccurately-named Bill of Rights did not stand for liberties all
should enjoy. It merely limited the federal government.'8 ' Citizens did
not have the rights it listed-unless the states choose to secure them.
American citizens still had to look to the states to protect their rights.""
While the Due Process Clause was still there, the Court said it, like the
rest of the Fourteenth Amendment, "adds nothing to the rights of one
citizen as against another."'' " Its protections were limited to violations by
states; Klansmen and similar groups that were killing and terrorizing
white and black Republicans because of their political opinions and
actions were not states.29' As to other guarantees, such as the right to
bear arms, the situation was even worse. If the Amendment secured
them (which it did not), still it was only a limit on state action. Protection
of Bill of Rights liberties seemed largely beyond federal power-at least
under the statutes Congress had passed to deal with the great evils of the
Klan and similar political terrorism. 9'
284. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).





290. Id. at 554.
291. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court: Congressional
Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the State Action Syllogism, A Brief
Historical Overview, i i U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. (forthcoming July 2009) (manuscript on file with the
Hastings Law Journal).
292. See generally Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (i9oo); Hurtado v. California, 11O U.S. 516
(1884); Curtis, supra note 291.
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In 1908, in Twining v. New Jersey, the Court considered and rejected
a claim that the privilege against self-incrimination limited the states.293
The Court acknowledged the claim that the first eight Amendments were
among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
protected against state action, and it cited two of the four Supreme Court
Justices who by that time had taken that view.2" In addition, the Court
said this view "was undoubtedly ... entertained by some of those who
framed the Amendment."295 But it was "not profitable to examine the
weighty arguments in its favor, for the question is no longer open in this
court.,,29
However, the Twining Court saw due process as a different matter,
because in 1897 in the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad case, the
Court had held the Due Process Clause protected against
uncompensated takings.2 "7 Based on that case, the Twining Court
concluded that "some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against
state action. '29' But if so, their presence in the Bill of Rights was just a
coincidence. As to their possible protection, the Court explained that "it
is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight
Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are
included in the conception of due process of law.''99 The test was
whether the right was "a fundamental principle of liberty and justice
which inheres in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable
right of a citizen of such a government. '  For the Justices, at least, the
privilege against self-incrimination failed the test.3 '
In Palko v. Connecticut, the relation of rights protected by due
process and some in the Bill of Rights was closer." ' The Court said that
some Bill of Rights liberties (those "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"3 3 ) had been
"brought within the Fourteenth Amendment [Due Process Clause] by a
process of absorption.""3 4 Curiously, Justice Cardozo described nearly all
293. 211 U.S. 78 (19o8).
294. Id. at 98 (citing Justices Harlan and Field, in Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 6o6, 617 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); O'Neil v. Vermont, I44 U.S. 323, 361 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 370 (Harlan,
Brewer, JJ., dissenting), but overlooking Justices Bradley and Swayne in the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1896).
298. 211 U.S. at 99 (citing Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 240).
299. Id.
300. Id. at Io6.
301. Id. at io.
302. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
303. Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (934)).
304. Id. at 325-26.
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the rights in the Bill of Rights with the collective phrase "privileges and
immunities." Some of these "privileges and immunities" were protected
by due process; other "immunities and privileges" in the Bill of Rights
were not.3'
In 1948, in Adamson v. California, Justice Hugo Black called for
total application of Bill of Rights liberties to the states, and he persuaded
three of his colleagues. 3°6 Justice Black revisited congressional history
and looked at congressional intent, particularly as revealed by leading
framers of the Amendment." Justice Felix Frankfurter rejected the
intent of leading framers. 3°8 Instead, he said, one should look at the
common understanding of the Amendment's words-though, curiously,
he refused to look at the common meaning at the time of the words
"privileges or immunities.""' He attributed his refusal to consider the
common meaning of privileges or immunities to the "mischievous uses"
to which the clause might be put." °
During the I960s, the Warren Court selectively applied most of the
remaining liberties in the Bill of Rights under the Due Process Clause
and used federal precedent to assess the dimension of the right."' The
application of Bill of Rights liberties to the states was explained in
Duncan v. Louisiana, where the Court applied the guaranty of criminal
jury trial to the states."2 The question was whether a particular right was
fundamental to the Anglo-American scheme of ordered liberty."3 The
Court noted that jury trial was required by every state.3"4 It emphasized
the trend of later decisions applying Bill of Rights liberties to the
states.3"5  This undermined earlier decisions which had rejected
application of the right to jury trial.' 6
305. Id. at 326.
306. 332 U.S. 46,71-74, 81 n.io (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 7-74.
308. Id. at 63-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 61.
31H. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas,
388. U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege
against compelled self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment
right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (i961) (Fourth Amendment); cf. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (constitutional right to privacy).
312. 391 U.S. at 15o.
313. Id. at 149.
314. Id. at 154.
315. Id. at 148.
36. Id. (distinguishing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (934); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (19oo)).
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V. REACTION
Warren Court decisions were controversial. The Court broadly
applied the criminal procedure guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the
states,317 forbade the states to compose prayers for public school children
to recite,"" and issued a series of decisions undermining the racial caste
system.319 By 1968, the Court had even struck down bans on interracial
marriage.3 0 Its decisions upholding congressional statutes banning
discrimination in employment and in places of public accommodation,3"'
and enforcing the right of African Americans in the South to vote,32
were supported by most Americans but were still controversial.323
Barry Goldwater captured the Republican nomination for President
in 1964.324 He strongly criticized the Warren Court.325 Along with his
gifted supporter, Ronald Reagan, he opposed the Civil Rights Act of
1964.326 He said it violated states' rights.327 He later opposed the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.3"8 Goldwater lost the election to Lyndon Johnson, but
carried the deep South.329 In spite of the defeat, a "movement
conservatism" was born.33 Johnson told his aide Bill Moyers that he had
delivered the South to the Republican Party for both of their
generations.33'
Movement conservatives and others attacked Warren Court
decisions as activist and as not in keeping with the original understanding
317. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
318. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
319. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
320. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. i, 2 (1967).
321. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
322. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966).
323. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 204, 233-34, 238, 391-
92, 495 (2O00) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed by a 70% to 30% margin in both houses
of Congress; the Voting Rights Act passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 333 to 85 and
in the Senate by a vote of 77 to 19). According to the Gallup Poll in May, 1964, between two otherwise
identical candidates, 6o% of the American public would favor one that took a strong stand in favor of
civil rights. 3 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1884 (1972).
324. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 168 (1999).
325. See POWE, supra note 323. See generally STEPHENSON, supra note 324, at 163-89.
326. TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-1965, at 356-57 (1998);
LOU CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 520 (1991).
327. BRANCH, supra note 326, at 523.
328. Joseph A. Loftus, Goldwater Hits Vote-Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1965, at 24.
329. See U.S. Electoral College, 1964 Election for the Forty-Fifth Term, http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/electoral-college/votes/I 9 65 _19 69 .html#i 9 64 (last visited June 1o, 2009).
330. BRANCH, supra note 326, at 404-05; THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN
HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 94-95 (2004).
331. BRANCH, supra note 326, at 404-05.
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of the Constitution.33 The application of the Bill of Rights to the States
was a particular target, denounced by prominent critics including Ronald
Reagan's Attorney General, Edwin Meese.333 Mr. Meese distributed a
speech to the ABA which described the incorporation doctrine as "a
politically violent and constitutionally suspect blow to federalism" whose
"intellectually shaky foundations" could not be "shored up. 334 Law
Professor Charles Rice described the doctrine as "flim flam under the
14th" and as a "fraud." '335 George Will announced that the Court had
taken a radically wrong turn when it applied the First Amendment to the
states.3 36
Law professors joined in.337 Even those who agreed with the
decisions applying the Bill of Rights liberties to the states announced
that history did not support the application.338 Their views were
supported by two Supreme Court Justices. In Duncan v. Louisiana,
Justices Harlan and Stewart wrote that the "overwhelming historical
evidence" marshaled by Charles Fairman (in a 1949, 173-page law review
article) demonstrated "conclusively" that the framers and ratifiers of
"the Fourteenth Amendment did not think they were 'incorporating' the
Bill of Rights." '339 Law professors who announced the absence of
historical support for the "incorporation doctrine" often cited the
Fairman article.34 Fairman's view was later reinforced by Raoul Berger,
who wrote a spirited attack on incorporation in his celebrated and often
inaccurate book, Government by Judiciary.34 '
Critics like Berger and Fairman were influenced by the view that
Reconstruction and the Civil War-era Republicans who had brought it
were disreputable.342 Though the South lost the Civil War, for many years
it won the battle for the history of Reconstruction. Instead of being a
second founding where Republicans sought to bring the nation closer to
332. POWE, supra note 325, at 204, 233-34, 238, 391-92, 495 (Goldwater's criticism of the Warren
Court). See generally STEPHENSON, supra note 325.
333. See supra note 332; infra note 334.
334. Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att'y Gen., Address Before the American Bar Association (July 9,
1985), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/id.49/default.asp. Mr. Meese did not read the
words on the incorporation doctrine which he distributed to the press, and the cover page of the
handout noted that "Mr. Meese may vary slightly from the text." Id.
335. Charles Rice, Flimflam Under the 14 th, WALL ST. J., July 3 1, 1985, at i8.
336. George Will, A Labored Ruling on Pornography, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., July 8, 1983, at
AI3.
337. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 2-4 (collecting examples).
338. Id.
339. 391 U.S. 145, 174 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Fairman, supra note 216).
340. CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 2,4-6 (citing BERGER, supra note 21, at 137; Curtis, Further
Adventures, supra note I).
341. BERGER, supra note 25, at 57-69, 155-74.
342. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 21, at 166 (citing BENJAMIN KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCION 192, 257 (914)) (noting that Kendrick called Senator
Howard a "Negrophile" and "reckless").
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the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble-and
thus closer to democracy and civil liberty-the widely adopted Southern-
elite view saw Reconstruction as a period of misrule imposed on the
South by ignorant former slaves, venal Northerners, and disreputable
Southern scalawags.' By this view, Reconstruction was a time when
"selfish politicians, backed by the federal government, for party purposes
attempted to Africanize the State and deprive the people through
misrule and oppression of most that life held dear."3'
The Southern-elite view of Reconstruction shaped too much of the
view of scholars critical of applying the Bill of Rights liberties to the
states. If Reconstruction was a time of misrule by selfish, crass, and
corrupt Republican politicians, ignorant blacks, and disreputable
Southern whites, then the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment look
very different. In his 1939 biography of Justice Miller, published by the
Harvard University Press, Charles Fairman referred to the Louisiana
government supported by whites and blacks as the "carpetbag
government.""34 According to Professor Fairman, when that government
was removed (by terror and fraud, actually), "self government was
restored in Louisiana." ' 6 In his effort to show that the views of Senator
Howard, who strongly supported incorporation, were unrepresentative,
Mr. Berger, in another book published by the Harvard University Press,
quoted Benjamin Kendrick, a historian following the Southern elite's
approach to Reconstruction history: "Howard, according to Kendrick,
was 'one of the most.. . reckless of the radicals,' who had 'served
consistently in the vanguard of the extreme Negrophiles."'347 As Mr.
Berger saw it, Howard's reckless radicalism was established by the fact
that he had held out "for black suffrage to the end."" 8 The negative
attitude toward Reconstruction by Professor Fairman and Mr. Berger
may also help to explain their extraordinarily ad hominem attacks on
Republicans such as John A. Bingham.349 But, as Michael Zuckert has
343. E.g., J. G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 667 (Faculty of
Political Sci. of Columbia Univ. eds., 1964) (1914); see also CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-i89o , at 18o (1939) (referring to the Reconstruction Republican
government of Louisiana as the "carpetbag government" and suggesting that the overthrow of that
government restored "self-government" in Louisiana). For the Southern elite inculcation of the view
that the Civil War was about states' rights and that slaves were happy and well-treated, see Fred
Arthur Bailey, Free Speech and the Lost Cause in the Old Dominion, VA. MAG. HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY,
Apr. 1995, at 237.
344. HAMILTON, supra note 343, at 667.
345. FAIRMAN, supra note 343, at 18o, 186.
346. Id. at 186. For additional negative comments by Fairman on Reconstruction, see the splendid
article by Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70
CHI-KENT L. REv. 1197, 1204 n.42 (1995).
347. BERGER, supra note 21, at I66 (quoting KENDRICK, supra note 342).
348. Id. (relying on KENDRICK, supra note 342).
349. See, e.g., id. at 164 (describing Bingham as "muddled"); id. at 219; Raoul Berger,
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wisely noted, "Important historical actors ... make sense to those around
them; that is why they are important actors. The historian's task is to
bring out their sense, not to denounce them as fools.""35
In 1954, W. W. Crosskey wrote a 154-page response to Fairman's
article in the University of Chicago Law Review.351 Crosskey's article was
trailblazing. Later scholars who have supported application of the Bill of
Rights to the states are deeply indebted to his work. Unlike Professor
Fairman and Mr. Berger, Professor Crosskey began to put Section I in
the context of the thirty years or so that led up to the Civil War,
including the suppression of civil liberty in the South in the interest of
protecting slavery from criticism or political action.35 '  Crosskey
recognized and took seriously the constitutional ideas embraced by a
number of leading Republicans, even when these did not accord with
Supreme Court orthodoxy.353 His reading of the debates made sense,
rather than nonsense, of what a number of leading Republicans had to
say in the Thirty-Ninth Congress. And he showed that Professor Fairman
had misconstrued significant parts of the debates.354
Justice Harlan and many law professors who expressed an opinion
on the subject of application of the Bill of Rights to the states did not cite
Crosskey's work.355 Presumably, they had not read it. Nor do they seem
to have read that of Alfred Avins, no friend of the Warren Court, who
reviewed the Crosskey and Fairman articles and concluded that Crosskey
had the stronger case. 356 In defense of the professors, most expressed
their historical judgment in passing, not after detailed review of the
historical evidence.357
However, among most scholars who have studied the issue in detail,
the unquestioning acceptance of the work of Professor Fairman and of
Mr. Berger has ebbed. That, at any rate, is the view of one who has
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
435, 450 (I98I) (describing Bingham as "veer[ing] as crazily as a rudderless ship" and as "unable
to... understand what he read").
350. Michael Zuckert, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 149
, 
I6I (i9i).
351. Crosskey, supra note 20.
352. Id. at 33-34 (citing Rep. Price); id. at 1o5--o7 (states in the Pennsylvania legislature during
ratification debate).
353. E.g., id. at 11-21 (old Republican legal ideas); id. at 27-28 (misreading Bingham); id. at 31
(misreading of Hale as opposing application).
354. E.g., id. at 10-21 (detailing how Professor Fairman misconstrued the Thirty-Ninth Congress
debates).
355. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171-93 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (not
mentioning the Crosskey article).
356. See Alfred Avins, The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HAv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 25-26
(1968).
357. See CuRTIs, No STATE, supra note i, at 1-2 (discussing the various professors' analyses).
358. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 14, at 183 ("In light of all this, it is astonishing that some scholars,
most notably Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger, have suggested that when Bingham invoked 'the bill
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If the Amendment was designed to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states, how can we explain its utter failure for so many years? The brief
civil-rights revolution after the Civil War was rapidly followed by
reaction.359  By its continued war of terror and fraud against
Reconstruction and equal rights, the Southern elite made clear that they
simply would not accept government by the white-black majority
coalition that for a time governed the South. 36 National enforcement of
civil liberties and of the right to vote, enforcement against Klan terror
and against the newly "redeemed" state governments, stood in the way
of finally ending the Civil War and in the way of national
reconciliation."' In spite of the advances in the Civil War period, racism
remained a powerful factor.362 In an era of immigration and labor unrest,
many opinion leaders in the North were increasingly skeptical of
democracy.6' Some openly called for an abandonment of
Reconstruction.6 ' Reconstruction in the South was abandoned by some
of its former friends, and a resurgent Democratic Party and an
increasingly big-business Republican one made further efforts unlikely.36'
The Court did its part by undermining a number of Reconstruction
statutes.366 The sad story has been told by a number of modern
of rights,' he didn't mean what he said."); CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 117-30; Aynes,
Misreading, supra note 19, at 66-73. See generally JAMES BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM:
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1997); Bond, supra note 217;
Wildenthal, Revisiting, supra note 19.
359. DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 130-31 (2ooI);
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 119-20 (200).
36o. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 587 (1988).
See generally Curtis, supra note 291.
361. BLIGHT, supra note 359, at 139.
362. Id. at 138 (citing the Nation, which announced on April 5, 1877, that the "negro will disappear
from the field of national politics. Henceforth, the nation, as a nation will have nothing more to do
with him.").
363. KEYSSAR, supra note 359, at 119-24.
364. BLIGHT, supra note 359, at 98-139.
365. Id. at 130-39.
366. See generally Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (19o4) (refusing to hear a challenge to
discriminatory voting registration practices occurring under the Alabama Constitution of 19O1);
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (allowing facially-neutral devices designed to eliminate as
many blacks as possible from the voting booths); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking
down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which prohibited discrimination in inns, railroads, steamboats, etc.);
United States v. Harris, lo6 U.S. 629 (1883) (denying federal power to punish members of a lynch
mob); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding Bill of Rights liberties merely limited
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historians.: 7 It is set out well in David W. Blight's book, Race and
Reunion.368
B. PARADOX Two
The case for application of substantive rights such as free speech and
the right to bear arms is strong under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, but as we have seen that was not the route the Court took.36
Instead the Court proceeded under Due Process, and there is some
historical support for reading the Clause to protect basic substantive
liberties. For example, Charles Sumner, speaking in Congress in 1864
said that the Due Process Clause, "[b]rief as it is, it is in itself alone a
whole bill of rights. '37' Though Cruikshank stands in the way of applying
the right to keep and bear arms to the states, Cruikshank supported this
outcome by rejecting application of any liberty in the Bill of Rights to the
states.37' In that respect, it has been totally undermined. Duncan
considered reliance on such a rejected view a reason to discount negative
precedent on jury trial.372 Almost all state constitutions protect an
individual right to bear arms not limited to militia service,373 a fact
Duncan considered significant as to jury trial.37" The Heller opinion
presents much nineteenth-century evidence supporting a right to bear
arms for self-defense.375 This may be fairly weak evidence of the meaning
of the Second Amendment. But, if one assumes that the rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment should be understood to be at least as
protective as people at the time of framing and ratification understood
them to be, this evidence supports the right of individuals to have arms
for self-defense.
At any rate, if it applies the Second Amendment right to bear arms
to the states, the Court will need to reject the equality-only reading. That
is not hard to do. As we have seen, one common description of the
Fourteenth Amendment was that it would protect all citizens in all their
constitutional rights.376 Making African Americans citizens and granting
all citizens fundamental constitutional rights, including those in the Bill
the federal government and not state or private actors).
367. See generally, e.g., FONER, supra note 36o; CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE
COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2oo8).
368. See BLIGHT, supra note 359, at 98-139.
369. See supra notes 293-305, 311 and accompanying text.
370. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1480 (1864); Dripps, supra note 217, at 1579 n.I II.
371. 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
372. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) ("Maxwell held that no provision of the Bill of
Rights applies to the States -a position long since repudiated ....").
373. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2793-94, 2802-04 (2008).
374. 391 U.S. at 154.
375. 128 S. Ct. at 2790-94, 2805-12.
376. E.g., CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 89-91, 131-45.
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of Rights, was one of two ways to advance equality as well as liberty.3" In
the Thirty-Ninth Congress, leading Republicans described the rights in
the Bill of Rights as fundamental rights.
378
In i866 (and before), the privileges and immunities of free speech,
free press, free exercise of religion, assembly, and the right to bear arms
were seen as fundamental to freedom.379 The references in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress to the right to bear arms as included among
constitutional rights belies the equality-only reading."" So does the
antislavery origins of the Fourteenth Amendment and of its Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The history recounted in Heller strongly supports the
understanding that the right to bear arms was, by the nineteenth century,
a fundamental, individual privilege and immunity of citizens. 8 ' The
Heller majority cited Joel Tiffany's "influential" Treatise on the
Unconstitutionality of American Slavery."' Tiffany believed that the
Federal Constitution protected American citizens "from the despotism of
states at home" and that any state law that deprived citizens of the
"rights, privileges, and immunities, granted by the Constitution" was
void.'83 The "privileges and immunities" of citizens of the United States
were "all the guarantys of the Federal Constitution for personal security,
personal liberty and private property."' ' To further define these Tiffany
listed rights in the Bill of Rights (including the "right to keep and bear
arms").3" An adaptation of Tiffany's views influenced those Republicans
who held a national liberties reading of the rights in Article IV.3
An opinion applying the right to bear arms to the states can follow
Duncan and avoid assessing the historical evidence bearing on
application of the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment. That avoids embarrassing facts and doctrinal
complications. But if the Court repeats the nineteenth-century historical
facts used in Heller, the ghost of the Privileges or Immunities Clause will
377. When, for example, all share the constitutional right to freedom of speech or free exercise of
religion, to that extent, they enjoy equality.
378. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 1294, 2766 (1866).
379. Id.
380. See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I at 131-38 (every right set out in the constitution
including the right to have arms); id. at 139-40 (constitutional rights including the right to bear arms
were rights of citizens of the United States); id. at 141 (denials of right to bear arms and other rights
basic to freedom); see also id. at 142 (broad reading of guarantees of the Civil Rights Act); id. at 143
(treating the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting the rights of American citizens and the Due
Process Clause as "rather more than the Bill of Rights"); id. at 144-45.
381. 128 S. Ct. at 2790-94, 2805-12.
382. Id. at 2789, 2807 (citing JOEL TIFFANY, TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN
SLAVERY 117-18 (Mnemosyne Publ'g Co. 1969) (1849)).
383. TIFFANY, supra note 382, at 55-58,87-88,97.
384. Id. at 97.
385. Id. at 56-58, 97, 99.
386. See, e.g., CURTIS, No STATE, supra note I, at 37-38 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 59-6i (Rep. Bingham).
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be haunting the feast. John Bingham and Jacob Howard are not
mentioned in Heller, but since both support a right to bear arms under
the Fourteenth Amendment,8' their absence from the application
opinion would be very strange.
If the Court applies the right under due process and Duncan-and
there are good reasons based on precedent and doctrine and stability to
do so-it should frankly recognize that substantial evidence under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause supports applying the Bill of Rights to
the states, and it should acknowledge the great plans by John A.
Bingham and Jacob Howard and others to nationalize basic protections
for liberty.3' Of course, acknowledgement involves at least tacitly
admitting what a mess the Court's early decisions on application made of
things. Still, the Court could suggest that the purposes of these framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment have largely been achieved under the Due
Process Clause. So the history provides significant support for the result,
even though the Court finds it unwise to change the clause on which it
has historically relied.
In the alternative, the Court can continue to ignore the history
leading up to the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
statements of leading framers. It can cherry-pick evidence about the right
to bear arms and ignore the tree from which much of it comes. Perhaps,
however, this is a time for candor and recapturing some of the lost
history of our nation's second founding.
Heller may not change much. State constitutions typically protect the
right to bear arms389 and courts may well give the right a reasonable
interpretation. But things may not be that simple. Professor Alan
Brownstein, in his brilliant article, suggests that a right to have arms for
self-defense may undermine tort duties to keep the arms locked up or
otherwise inaccessible so children cannot easily access them.3" The
theory is that the right to have arms implies a right to use them for self-
defense and immediate access may be a necessary part of that right-
undermining trigger locks, requiring weapons to be locked up so children
387. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., ist Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Bingham); CoNG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2765 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard).
388. See supra Part III.B.2-5.
389. See, e.g., Apiz. CONST. art. II, § 26; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3; N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 30; OIo
CONST. art. I, § 4; PA. CONST. art. I, § 21; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3; VA. CONST. art. I, § 13; W. VA. CONST.
art. 11, § 22. According to the Second Amendment Foundation Online, forty-four of fifty states have
state constitutional provisions enumerating the right to keep and bear arms. Second Amendment
Foundation Online, http://www.saf.org (follow "State Constitutional Protections" hyperlink under
"Resources") (last visited June 1o, 2009).
39o. Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal Law,
Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 6o HASTINGs LJ. 1205,
1226-27 (2009).
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cannot get them, etc.39' He also suggests that if the right to bear arms
includes the right to use them for self-defense, self-defense cases
involving arms may become federal questions.392 This and grave problems
of gun violence suggest the need to temper logic with prudence. Heller
rightly recognized the need to cabin the right in the interest of public
safety.3 3 If applying the right in Heller to the states federalizes all sorts of
self-defense and tort cases and strips states of the ability to enact
reasonable regulations to protect children and the public safety, then
safety and federalism (along with children and others victims of
negligence) may be unintended casualties.
CONCLUSION
In issues such as the meaning of Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the historical evidence is always going to be somewhat
mixed. The task is to decide which hypothesis better fits the facts. To the
extent that courts use history on questions of this sort, it is always going
to be a question of the preponderance of the evidence. Application plus
equality is consistent with a great deal of the evidence. The equality-only
approach is not.
On historical questions, it is important to acknowledge cross
currents and paradoxes. There is substantial evidence that a personal
right to bear arms was one of the privileges the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to protect. Disarming African Americans was deeply
obnoxious. But we should be cautious before endorsing the idea that gun
rights would somehow have rescued African Americans from the horrors
that followed. Well-armed Southern paramilitary groups, insisting on
their right to acquire arms, were a spearhead of anti-Reconstruction
terror.394 African Americans were typically poor and had less effective
weapons." In most cases they had less military training. 3"6 Economic
realities left African Americans out-gunned and vulnerable in many
ways.
What the Reconstruction governments needed was strong
intervention from the North to protect freedom of political association,
democracy, and the right to vote. The Court did its part to hobble
statutes passed by Congress to protect liberty and democracy in the
391. Id. at 1231-44.
392. See id.
393. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2oo8).
394. LANE, supra note 367, at 217-28.
395. Id. at 72, 93 (while the white attackers in Cruikshank had multiple guns, only two-thirds of the
black men had even one gun and these were generally shotguns or otherwise inferior weapons).
396. Id. at 92-93.
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Reconstruction South. And most in the North soon lost interest in
protecting Southern Republicans and African Americans."
History is full of ironies. Since the Warren Court, more
"conservative" justices have cut back on-and occasionally repudiated-
much of its work. 39 But incorporation of the Bill of Rights seems to be
here to stay, though the nature of the incorporated liberties is changing
and may change further, sometimes in a more Gilded Age direction.3"
The Roberts Court is likely to expand application of the Bill of Rights to
the states in the case of the Second Amendment, while, for example,
sapping the Fourth Amendment of some of its remaining effect. If the
Court revisits the history it has ignored for so long and strongly supports
the historical basis for the incorporation doctrine, that will be a victory
for facts too long ignored. For those strongly committed to individual
liberty, the victory may also be bittersweet because of retreat in other
areas.
397. Id. at 249; see also BLIGHT, supra note 359, at 130-31, 135, 138-39.
398. Compare United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), with United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2ooo); compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (ig7i), with Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (976).
399. Compare McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), with FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 541
U.S. 449 (2oo7) (perhaps opening the door for corporate finance of political parties and through them
of political campaigns, further corrupting the agency or fiduciary relation that should exist between
representatives and the people they represent).
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